Determining the status of non-transferred embryos in Ireland: a conspectus of case law and implications for clinical IVF practice by unknown
BioMed Central
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities 
in Medicine
ssOpen AcceCommentary
Determining the status of non-transferred embryos in Ireland: a 
conspectus of case law and implications for clinical IVF practice
Eric Scott Sills*1,2 and Sarah Ellen Murphy3
Address: 1Division of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, Department of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, School of Medicine, Royal College of 
Surgeons in Ireland, Dublin, Ireland, 2The Sims Institute/Sims International Fertility Clinic, Dublin 14, Ireland and 3Department of Law, 
University College Cork, Cork, Ireland
Email: Eric Scott Sills* - drscottsills@sims.ie; Sarah Ellen Murphy - murfsara4@gmail.com
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
The development of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) as a treatment for human infertilty was among the
most controversial medical achievements of the modern era. In Ireland, the fate and status of
supranumary (non-transferred) embryos derived from IVF brings challenges both for clinical
practice and public health policy because there is no judicial or legislative framework in place to
address the medical, scientific, or ethical uncertainties. Complex legal issues exist regarding
informed consent and ownership of embryos, particularly the use of non-transferred embryos if a
couple separates or divorces. But since case law is only beginning to emerge from outside Ireland
and because legislation on IVF and human embryo status is entirely absent here, this matter is
poised to raise contractual, constitutional and property law issues at the highest level. Our analysis
examines this medico-legal challenge in an Irish context, and summarises key decisions on this issue
rendered from other jurisdictions. The contractual issues raised by the Roche case regarding
informed consent and the implications the initial judgment may have for future disputes over
embryos are also discussed. Our research also considers a putative Constitutional 'right to
procreate' and the implications EU law may have for an Irish case concerning the fate of frozen
embryos. Since current Medical Council guidelines are insufficient to ensure appropriate regulation
of the advanced reproductive technologies in Ireland, the report of the Commission on Assisted
Human Reproduction is most likely to influence embryo custody disputes. Public policy requires
the establishment and implementation of a more comprehensive legislative framework within
which assisted reproductive medical services are offered.
Introduction
Although the status of the 'unborn' has been debated
since Aristotle [1,2], the search for clarification has never
been more urgent. In delivering judgment on a dispute
over the control of non-transferred embryos, Irish courts
confront this ancient question in a way that will yield
answers aspiring to be definitive, but will probably not
receive universal approval. They may look to philosophi-
cal debate in order to make an informed decision about
the status of the non-transferred embryo compared to the
status of the naturally conceived (in vivo) embryo and the
subsequent protections afforded to it. This judicial land-
scape is not entirely new: the abortion debate also pivoted
on this question, as did the issues of whether the contra-
ceptive pill was ethically acceptable. Irish courts could
also be influenced by the debates surrounding the (ulti-
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tion Bill [3], as this reflected the prevailing electoral
opinion on reproductive issues in 1983.
While selecting conception as the beginning of human life
has intrinsic appeal due to its simplicity as a discrete, iden-
tifiable event, that very characteristic draws criticism [4,5].
This approach means that human embryos conceived
either naturally (in vivo) or with medical assistance (in
vitro) would be accorded the same legal rights and protec-
tions. However, the non-transferred IVF embryo (in con-
trast to the in vivo embryo) is not necessarily 'on the way
to being born'. Indeed, the embryo derived from IVF treat-
ment still requires a significant amount of skill and inter-
vention in order to provide it with the potential to be
born. If this is not provided by medical science, and if the
embryo is not transferred to the uterus, then the non-
transferred embryo will not be born. If this view of the
moral status of the embryo were strictly followed, then
'any research or other manipulationthat damages any
embryo or interferes with its prospects for transfer to a
uterus and subsequent development is ethically unaccept-
ableonce conceived, the being was recognised as man
because he had man's potential. The criterion for human-
ity thus was simple and all-embracing: If you are con-
ceived by human parents, you are human'[6].
The potentiality argument assigns legal rights to the
embryo derived from IVF on the basis that it has the poten-
tial to develop into a human being. This approach admits
the uncertainty of pinpointing the exact time when life
can be said to begin, and instead advocates that the
embryo deserves entitlements because it has the potential
for human life. But how should this potentiality position
be applied to non-transferred embryos? In one sense, it
fails to reconcile the distinction between what is and what
could be. For example, 'the bare fact that something will
become X (even if it will inevitably become X, which is far
from being the case with the fertilised egg and the adult
human being) is not a good reason for treating it now as
if it were in fact X.' For example, anyone now reading these
words is potentially dead, but that is hardly justification
for treating those individuals as if they were already dead
[7].
In the UK, the Warnock Report [4,8] concluded that the
human embryo obtained from IVF does not have the
potential to develop into a human merely because it occu-
pies a petri dish in the laboratory. From this application
of the potentiality principle, the IVF embryo has an unde-
clared (i.e., yet to be determined) moral value and may be
stored, used for research purposes, or discarded. This posi-
tion is supported by the recognised high loss rate for
human embryos throughout the early stages of pregnancy
in nature. Should Irish Courts adopt this potentiality prin-
ciple in their quest to define the term 'unborn' for the pur-
poses of the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3 of the
Constitution, then it will still have to define when the
embryo has the potential to become a human being.
Considering the contraveiling philosophical position
holding that IVF embryos have no moral status that makes
them worthy of protection, it has been argued that 'the
most widely held view of the status of the embryo takes an
intermediate position. It holds that the embryo deserves
respect greater than that accorded to other human tissue,
because of its potential to become a person and the sym-
bolic meaning that carries for many people'[9]. This rec-
ognises that the embryo is a living entity deserving some
respect, although not at the same level of protection as
human persons. In other words, the IVF embryo before
transfer should be afforded some protection due to its
potential to develop into a human being and the symbolic
significance it has [10]. Irish Courts might adopt this
intermediate position when ascertaining the beginning of
life in the context of a dispute over the fate of stored
embryos.
Regulatory dynamics in Ireland and the United Kingdom
Over the past 20 years, modern fertility treatments includ-
ing IVF have become more widely available to medical
consumers. Although the advanced reproductive technol-
ogies are now more culturally accepted than before, how
these treatments are regulated in Ireland creates difficulty
for both consumers and providers, if a couple has stored
embryos and their personal or family situation changes.
Given the persuasive authority of the UK legal system in
Ireland, legislators in Ireland might consider the UK's
legal response to assisted reproduction as they develop
here. Regulation of IVF in the UK is based on the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990 [11]. This
Act established one organisation, the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Authority (HFEA), to supervise and
license all fertility clinics throughout the UK It also pro-
vides information and advice to the British government
about embryos and treatment services governed by the
Act, and endeavours to ensure that the whole area of
reproductive technology is practiced in a transparent man-
ner. But because no similar unifying agency exists in Ire-
land, on matters of communication, control, and public
accountability, the regulation of IVF in Britain is in stark
contrast to that in Ireland.
Although regulation of the advanced reproductive tech-
nologies in Ireland is evolving, it remains fragmented and
less sophisticated than in the UK The Medical Council
was, by default, the only statutory body having any
authority over IVF until recent years, when at least two
other quasi-government bodies (the Irish Medicines
Board and the Commission on Patient Safety and QualityPage 2 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:8 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/8Assurance) began to take an interest in regulating some
aspects of assisted reproductive procedures.
Originally, the Medical Council exerted control over IVF
because an agency with a specific remit for the advanced
reproductive technologies was lacking. This circumstance
necessitated IVF being regulated by the same board as all
other branches of medicine. As of 2009, Ireland still does
not have a single organisation mandated to coordinate
monitoring and regulatory efforts for IVF, analogous to
the HFEA in the UK Although the Institute of Obstetri-
cians & Gynaecologists is the advisory body to the Medical
Council on 'all matters relating to obstetrics and gynaecol-
ogy in Ireland', when approached for direction or
approval on providing specific IVF applications, the Insti-
tute issued a statement that it 'does not believe that it is
within its remit to do so' [12].
The Medical Council was established under the Medical
Practitioners Act [13] with responsibility for registering all
physicians and setting professional practice standards.
This body periodically publishes A Guide to Ethical Con-
duct and Behaviour [14] to provide 'a set of principles
which doctors must apply in each situation, together with
their judgement, experience, knowledge and skills'. The
most recent Medical Council guidelines (March 2004)
concerning IVF reminded doctors 'of their obligation to
preserve life and to promote health. The creation of new
forms of life for experimental purposes or the deliberate
and intentional destruction of in vitro life already formed
is professional misconduct' [14]. The Medical Council
guidelines also state that IVF should only be used after
thorough investigation has failed to reveal a treatable
cause for infertility. Prior to fertilisation of an ovum,
extensive discussion and counselling is essential. Any fer-
tilised ovum must be used for normal implantation and
must not be deliberately destroyed. Cryopreservation
techniques have allowed greater flexibility in scheduling
embryo transfers with no adverse effect on reproductive
outcome, so IVF clinics can freeze surplus (non-trans-
ferred) embryos and remain compliant with Medical
Council guidelines.
In response to EU Cell and Tissue Directive 2004/23/EC
[15], the Irish Medicines Board (IMB) acquired a role in
regulating IVF laboratories due to the designation of such
facilities as 'tissue establishments'. The IMB exists to
assure compliance with international standards regarding
quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing,
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of
human tissues and cells. The task of accreditation of all
Irish IVF programmes was therefore taken up by the IMB
with a view to develop a system for notification of adverse
events and reactions, to organise inspections and control
measures, as well as to ensure data protection and confi-
dentiality. The IMB also focused on tissue traceability and
record maintenance that could interface with a single
European coding system.
In contrast to the broad nature of the Medical Council
guidelines, the IMB approach to 'tissue establishments' is
more narrowly defined. As 'tissue establishments', IVF
providers in Ireland are required to secure a specific
license from the IMB for human embryology laboratory
operations. This IMB involvement in the arena of the
advanced reproductive technologies, while perhaps
appearing highly circumscribed, actually manifests a pow-
erful regulatory presence over IVF since the embryology
laboratory plays such a crucial role in the provision of IVF.
Indeed, any IVF centre's laboratory licensure status as
determined by the IMB also by extension determines the
fate of that particular clinical IVF programme.
Yet another entity with regulatory input regarding assisted
reproductive treatments is the Commission on Patient
Safety and Quality Assurance (CPSQA). This commission
was chartered to "develop clear and practical recommen-
dations to ensure quality and safety of care for patients".
It concluded its work in mid-2008, and proposed regular
clinical audits and a three-year licensing scheme for IVF
clinics as part of the 'Building a Culture of Patient Safety'
initiative [16]. The government of Ireland also chartered a
Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (CAHR)
to guide approaches for regulating the advanced repro-
ductive technologies here [17]. The absence of any Irish
legislation dealing specifically with assisted reproduction
left the CAHR free to consider the question ab initio. This
multi-disciplinary panel issued a comprehensive report in
2005 addressing social, ethical and legal factors to be
taken into account in determining public policy [18]. As
the most recent expert examination of reproductive treat-
ments in Ireland, the CAHR report highlighted the fact
that Medical Council guidelines alone have insufficient
depth to ensure appropriate regulation of the advanced
reproductive technologies. Having examined current leg-
islation in the UK and other countries, the CAHR report
concluded that regulation by statute was desirable in Ire-
land [18].
Constitutional considerations in Ireland
According to the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3 of The
Irish Constitution [19], 'The State acknowledges the right
to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal
right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect,
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindi-
cate that right.' It is unclear, however, whether the protec-
tion stipulated in the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3
applies from the instant of fertilisation or from some sub-
sequent point in the developmental process. In the mod-
ern age of IVF, this dilemma thrusts the most ancient ofPage 3 of 15
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section of medicine and law [2]. It is not merely a philo-
sophical exercise; indeed it must be posed in order to
determine when Constitutional protections are afforded
to the embryo [5,10,20]. When the question is settled, it
will establish what might be done with the embryo and
also who decides in the event of any dispute. The fact that
this matter has not been addressed by legislative or judi-
cial process has significant implications for patients seek-
ing fertility treatment in Ireland. Clarification can only be
obtained from a substantive pronouncement from the
higher Courts or by way of Constitutional referendum.
This very controversy emerges in the matter of Roche v.
Roche et al [21], a case certain to impact the future of fer-
tility treatment in Ireland. The dispute involves a woman
who wished to use embryos created by her eggs and her
husband's sperm during their marriage in an attempt to
become pregnant. After the couple had separated, the
embryos remained in storage at an IVF centre in Dublin.
Subsequently, her estranged husband refused to give con-
sent for the embryos to be transferred. Mrs. Roche con-
tends that the embryos had a 'right to life' by virtue of the
Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitu-
tion, and accordingly the embryos must be transferred in
order to give them an opportunity to grow and develop in
the womb and be born. The central challenge in the Roche
case is establishing a definition of the term 'unborn' for
the purposes of Constitutional law [21]. The vagueness of
the term 'unborn' in Ireland is not new, and has been
illustrated by legal difficulties in other contexts [22].
Constitutional protection for the 'unborn' or 'non-
transferred'?
An analysis of the campaign surrounding the 1983
Amendment to the Irish Constitution suggests that sup-
porters of the amendment were satisfied that the term
'unborn' provided protection from the time of concep-
tion. The then-Deputy Prime Minister Richard Spring, said
that 'It is clear that the word 'unborn' is likely to be inter-
preted by the Supreme Court as the moment at which the
human ovum is penetrated by a sperm – the moment
when human life commences' [23]. Yet the legally nebu-
lous nature of the term 'unborn' makes it difficult to deter-
mine from which specific point in the fertilisation process
the Constitution begins to protect life.
The case of Attorney General (Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd
[24] concluded that the right to life of the unborn applied
from the moment of conception. Indeed, the Green Paper
on Abortion [25] concurred with the ruling that conception
(fertilisation) is the starting point for statutory protection
of the 'unborn'. But a close reading of the Court's decision
raises the possibility that the event of fertilisation may
have been erroneously equated with the related (but phys-
iologically distinct) process of implantation, which, for
IVF patients, is conditional upon undergoing embryo
transfer. Indeed, it was asserted that the human embryo
either in vivo (in the body) or in vitro (in the laboratory) is
entitled to constitutional protection from the moment of
conception [1,26-28]. If the embryo were to be guaran-
teed Constitutional protection from the instant of concep-
tion, then this could bring significant complications to
the provision of reproductive medicine in Ireland. For
example, if Constitutional protection were applied to all
IVF embryos prior to in utero transfer, then would assisted
embryo hatching (or any other beneficial/therapeutic pro-
cedure performed on an embryos) become assault? Cer-
tainly no action could be taken to allow IVF embryos to
perish. Some authors [29] have expressed the view that 'it
cannot be said with certainty whether the protection
afforded by the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3 to the
"unborn" applies from the moment of fertilisation, the
moment of the implantation or from some later date.'
Nevertheless, in resolving a dispute over non-transferred
embryos, Irish Courts may consider this judgment as it is
the only substantive Irish precendent addressing the Con-
stitutional status of the 'unborn' to date.
Attorney General v. X [30] concerned an application by the
State to prevent a fourteen year old girl (who was pregnant
as a result of rape) from travelling to the UK for an abor-
tion. There was evidence of 'real and substantial risk' that
the girl would take her own life unless she left Ireland for
the procedure. Mr. Justice Costello granted the injunction,
but the Supreme Court reversed this decision on appeal
and held that there was a real and substantial threat to the
life of the girl, and that in such circumstances, the termi-
nation of pregnancy was constitutionally permissible
[30].
Mr. Justice McCarthy added, 'I think it reasonable...to
hold that the people when enacting the [Eighth Amend-
ment to the Constitution] were entitled to believe that leg-
islation would be introduced so as to regulate the manner
in which the right to life of the unborn and the mother
could be reconciled' [30]. This statement highlights the
fact that, if the Court attempts to provide any definition of
the 'unborn' in a dispute over the fate of non-transferred
human embryos, then the wishes of the electorate who
enacted the Eighth Amendment may require interpreta-
tion. Given the novelty of IVF in 1983, it will be difficult
for the Court now to ascertain public sentiment now
based on electoral data collected then. The Court may
consider that if the electorate were aware of the various
contingencies associated with the advanced reproductive
technologies, then they would have perhaps wanted the
embryo to be protected from the earliest time possible, i.e.
from the moment of fertilisation.Page 4 of 15
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mented that distinctions could not be made between the
phases of unborn life before birth. It was his position that
Constitutional protection was not restricted by any condi-
tion the unborn was required to attain: 'The Eighth
Amendment establishes beyond any dispute that the Con-
stitutional guarantee of the vindication and protection of
life is not qualified by the condition that the life must be
one which has achieved an independent existence after
birth. The right of life is guaranteed to every life born or
unborn. One cannot make distinctions between individ-
ual phases of the unborn life before birth or between
unborn and born life' [30].
This case generated intense debate throughout Ireland
regarding the socially charged issue of abortion, and high-
lighted the inconsistencies in the Constitutional provison
governing the protection of the 'unborn' [31]. The Consti-
tutional Review Group (CRG) [32] subsequently focused
on this point and recognised that the lack of clarity sur-
rounding the definition of the unborn was creating signif-
icant legal and moral difficulties: 'There is no definition of
"unborn" which, used as a noun, is at least odd. One
would expect "unborn human" or "unborn human
being". Presumably the term "unborn child" was not cho-
sen because of the uncertainty as to when a foetus might
be properly so described. Definition is needed as to when
the "unborn" acquires the protection of the law. Philoso-
phers and scientists may continue to debate when human
life begins, but the law must define what it intends to pro-
tect. "Unborn" seems to imply "on the way to being born"
or "capable of being born". Whether this condition is
obtained from fertilisation of the ovum, implantation of
the fertilised ovum in the womb, or some other point has
not yet been defined' [32].
The expression 'on the way to being born', as recom-
mended by the CRG, supports the argument that the non-
transferred embryo should not be guaranteed protection
by the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3 of the Constitu-
tion. This is because without transfer and subsequent
implantation in the uterus, the embryo cannot be assured
to be ' on the way to being born' or 'capable of being
born'. Indeed, many fertilised eggs are lost naturally and
never implant in the uterus. As the All-Party Oireachtas
Committee on the Constitution in its Fifth Progress
Report on Abortion stated: 'great numbers of fertilised ova
are lost in the natural course of things and never become
implanted in the uterine wall. As a result some argue that
implantation is the decisive event in the development of
unborn life' [33].
An alternate interpretation offered in the CAHR report
suggested that new human life exists once the process of
fertilisation is complete; the embryo is more than simply
a cluster of cells – for once destroyed, it is impossible to
recreate that particular life [34]. From this position, it
seems evident that any court decision concluding that a
non-transferred embryo from IVF has the same 'right to
life' as the embryo formed without assistance would have
a profound effect on the provision of IVF in Ireland. Such
a definition would certainly have implications for any
couple engaged in litigation over the fate of stored
embryos, since the non-transferred human embryo would
legally acquire the classification as an 'unborn' for the pur-
poses of the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3. By exten-
sion, if such a definition were to be legally instituted, in
order to 'defend and vindicate' its 'right to life' the State
would seem obliged to have some legal mechanism to
require the embryo to be transferred to a uterus. But would
this level of governmental involvement override the pro-
creational right of any party wishing to avoid parenthood
[35,36]? This brings forward the important issues of
'abandoned' embryos [37] currently in storage at Irish fer-
tility clinics, and the equally vexing challenge of manda-
tory transfer of embryos known to carry a genetic disease
[38]. By extension, Irish Courts might determine that all
IVF embryos come within the protection of the Eighth
Amendment/Article 40.3.3. If this were to be the case, it
would directly impact IVF providers and patients since it
would require that all embryos produced would have to
be transferred to the woman's uterus. Presumably, this
would have to include the transfer of embryos even if they
were found to be defective via pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis. However, if the Eighth Amendment/Article
40.3.3 were determined not to apply to non-transferred
IVF embryos, then there would be no Constitutional
impediment to pre-implantation genetic diagnosis where
embryos are "de-selected" for transfer based on a genetic
condition. In 2005, the CAHR report recommended that
the embryo formed by IVF should not attract legal protec-
tion until it was transferred in utero, at which stage it
should have the same legal protection as the embryo cre-
ated in vivo [18].
But is procreative liberty (the personal freedom either to
have children or to avoid having them) Constitutionally
protected? If it exists at all, any legal 'right' to reproduce
appears to be a negative right, meaning that other persons
have a duty not to interfere with the exercise of procreative
choice. It does not imply any obligation for others to pro-
vide resources necessary to exercise that choice [39].
In Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County [40], the
applicants wished to have cryopreserved sperm destroyed
'to prevent the birth of a fatherless child, disruption of
their existing family, and additional emotional, psycho-
logical and financial stress'. In a dispute over the fate of
frozen IVF embryos, a similar argument may be advanced
by the party seeking to avoid procreation. In the HechtPage 5 of 15
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constituted property by ruling that Hecht was entitled to
use the sperm bequeathed to her.
Where a conflict of procreative autonomy has arisen, thus
far judges tend to favour the party seeking to avoid procre-
ation, as the alternate decision would force unwanted par-
enthood on that party [35,41,42]. The Irish judiciary
could adopt a similar approach should any conflict of pro-
creative rights arise here. Undoubtedly, the relevance of
the Constitution to such rights will also have to be consid-
ered by the court.
In a dispute over frozen embryos, the party wishing to use
the embryos for transfer may argue that they have a Con-
stitutional right to procreate, and any legal manoeuvre to
prevent embryo transfer would be an infringement of that
right. This argument may be forwarded if the court decides
that the embryo is not protected by virtue of the 'right to
life' guarantee contained in the Eighth Amendment/Arti-
cle 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution. Indeed, this may also
be argued if the embryo is regarded as having an intrinsic
'right to life', as procreational rights will then be assessed
without the impingement of constitutional provisions.
However, while there is a Constitutional right to procre-
ate, that right is not absolute in its guarantee. Article
40.3.1 protects a host of unenumerated rights, one of
which is the right to procreate.
This issue first came before the Court in Murray v. Ireland
[43], where the plaintiffs were husband and wife both
serving sentences of penal servitude for life. They had no
children and conjugal visits were denied during incarcera-
tion. The plaintiffs claimed that as a married couple, they
had a right to beget children, that this right was protected
by the Irish Constitution, and that it was being infringed
as a function of their imprisonment. The plaintiffs argued
that as lawfully married persons, they had a basic human
right to procreate and that this right was Constitutionally
protected. Although they argued that there was a hierarchy
of protected rights, and that the right to procreate children
was very high on that scale of values, the Court rejected
this claim [43]. Such a position may be taken by a party
seeking to avoid procreation where the non-transferred
embryo has been accorded Constitutional protection.
A legislative approach for Ireland
Considering the absence of a clear Constitutional role in
the regulation of assisted reproduction in Ireland, politi-
cal leaders may be influenced by legislation in the United
Kingdom. The issues of greatest concern were addressed
by the HFE Act 1990. In response to an amendment to this
Bill seeking to clarify the legal status of the human
embryo, a former Lord Chancellor stated, 'An embryo is
not a chattelA human entity which is living is not a chattel
and neither is it a person in any ordinary senseIt is wrong
to try and define a human embryo in terms of established
legal definitions which are plainly inapplicable to human
embryos. Why must an embryo be one or the other? Why
cannot it just be an embryo?' [44].
These remarks from the UK suggest that the non-trans-
ferred embryo is sui generis, occupying a category of
interim property. In any event, the amendment was with-
drawn and consequently the legal status of the embryo
remained undefined. The Warnock Report [8] which pre-
ceded the HFEA, expressed that 'Until now the law has
never had to consider the existence of embryos outside the
mother's uterus. The existence of such embryos raises
potentially difficult problems as to ownership. The con-
cept of ownership of human embryos seems to us to be
undesirable. We recommend that legislation be enacted to
ensure that there is no right of ownership in a human
embryo' [45]. But creating a new, third category of
'interim property' may not fully remedy the challenges
brought by non-transferred IVF embryos. It has been
claimed that 'the court would have no choice but to treat
an extra-corporeal embryo as either a person or a chattel.
The likely outcome would be that it would be held to be a
chattel. Such law that exists points in this direction and
the pragmatism of the common law would see that to
treat an extra-corporeal embryo as a chattel is more con-
sistent with common sense than for it to be given the
rights of a person' [46].
While the HFE Act 1990 does not explicitly define the
legal status of the embryo, it does vest control of such
embryos in the providers of the genetic material [11]. In
the UK, this is accomplished by a mechanism whereby the
consents of gamete providers determine the disposition of
the embryos and define the power to control the use of the
embryos derived therefrom. Specifically, the gamete pro-
vider must, at the time that the gametes are procured, indi-
cate in writing for what purpose(s) those gametes may be
used. The gametes, and/or any resulting embryos may
only be used in accordance with the provisions obtained
from written informed consent [36,47,48]. In the UK, this
documentation confers legal control to the gamete pro-
viders, thereby minimising the type of disputes which
have taken place in the United States regarding the dispo-
sition of gametes and embryos. The IVF provider must
provide thorough counselling and obtain an effective
written informed consent from the couple seeking treat-
ment (the gamete providers) to delineate the scope of use
to which the gametes and/or embryos may be put [49].
While the topics covered in these medical consents are
unpleasant and may be awkward for couples about to
undergo IVF, it is imperative that the treating clinic makes
an effort to document the patients' wishes across a widePage 6 of 15
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sequence.
These scenarios should include what is to be done with
gametes and/or non-transferred embryos if the couple
separate or divorce, if the gamete donor dies or becomes
incompetent, the use to which the material can be put,
and the maximum period for which the material can be
cryopreserved. The task of discussing these various inter-
and post-treatment eventualities is assigned to the physi-
cian who collects the informed consent, because the IVF
doctor is considered to be the individual best suited to
respond to medical questions arising from the advanced
reproductive technologies. A similar regulatory process
could be introduced in Ireland to combat the inconsisten-
cies that emanate from the absence of explicit regulation.
Indeed, it has been suggested that an IVF informed con-
sent defining the disposition of non-transferred embryos
would do much to avoid future unspecified situtations
that may come before Irish courts [46]. The legislative
model in the UK gives dispositional control to the gametic
contributors of the embryo via a detailed written
informed consent process that must be obtained before
commencing IVF treatment. While Irish legislators could
adopt a similar approach, they will have to be mindful of
any determinations the Courts assert in the current Roche
case regarding the constitutional status of such embryos.
A property model for non-transferred embryos?
Judges and legislators must now regard embryos and gam-
etes in ways never before necessary or possible. If Irish
courts do not ascertain that the frozen IVF embryo
deserves Constitutional protection, then they could rely
on the property model as a determining factor in resolving
a dispute over the fate of frozen embryos. Such 'a property
analysis may allow more flexibility in defining the legal
status of the embryo and properly serve the needs of pub-
lic policy' [36,47,50].
The lack of legal authority in Ireland has significant impli-
cations for the landmark Roche case now before the Irish
judiciary. In looking to other jurisdictions, the Court may
explore the issue of whether or not the embryo can be per-
ceived as property for the purposes of ascertaining who
has dispositional control over that embryo. However, this
approach is not without difficulty: 'In law it is usual to cat-
egorise things into property, which can be owned and
controlled, and persons, which cannot. It is difficult to
decide which of these categories is most appropriate for
the embryo' [39].
The classification of a non-transferred IVF embryo as
property means that its ownership will be vested in the
parents of those gametes that gave rise to the embryo. This
would permit the couple to determine and control the fate
of their IVF embryos including disposal of any such
embryo(s) in any way they wished.
Yet, there is the proposition that the language of property
is inappropriate for discussions of the human embryo.
Indeed, it may be argued that it is unrealistic to suggest
that one person has 'property' in another whole living
body. A host of complex legal issues also would emerge
from this application of the property model in assisted
reproduction including which of the parents can claim
custody, the possibility of sharing embryos equally
between the disputing couple, and the consequent moral
difficulties that follow. Because this issue has come before
senior courts in other jurisdictions, Irish judges may con-
sider the settled case law elsewhere to ascertain how best
to resolve a dispute over the fate of stored embryos here.
In the United States, a property model was applied in
Davis v. Davis [51], a case regarding non-transferred
embryos. In this dispute, the central question was who
should have dispositional control over stored IVF
embryos following divorce. The ex-wife wished to use the
embryos in an attempt to become pregnant. The ex-hus-
band did not wish to become a father, and further con-
tended that to proceed with embryo transfer against his
wishes was a direct infringement of his right to avoid pro-
creation. The Tennessee Supreme Court considered the
'person v. property' dichotomy, and held that 'Pre-
embryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or
'property' but occupy an interim category that entitles
them to special respect because of their potential for
human life'. Judgment was affirmed in the ex-husband's
favour.
Therefore, although the Tennessee Supreme Court
rejected the application of an absolute property model in
Davis, it did recognise the decision-making control over
the embryo by the couple. That decision was influenced
by a report by The American Fertility Society, which rec-
ommended that 'Within the limits set by institutional pol-
icies, decision-making authority regarding pre-embryos
should reside with the persons who have provided the
gametes...in the absence of specific legislation on the sub-
ject' [52]. However, the matter of decisional authority has
been criticised as just another way to ask the basic ques-
tion of who 'owns' the IVF embryo. As one author noted
'Ownership does not signify that embryos may be treated
in all respects like other property. Rather the term merely
designates who decides which legally available options
will occur, such as creation, freezing, discard, donation,
use in research and placement in a uterus. Although the
bundle of property rights attached to one's ownership of
an embryo may be more circumscribed than for other
things, it is an ownership or property interest nonetheless'Page 7 of 15
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Davis could be regarded as an instance where 'recognition
of the existence of a proprietary or perhaps pseudo-propri-
etary or quasi-ownership interest' [54] prevailed. Accord-
ingly, if the IVF embryo constitutes property and belongs
to the couple who contributed the genetic material to cre-
ate that embryo, then it follows that the couple should
have decisional authority over its fate.
The property model was also applied in York v. Jones [55],
where an IVF clinic refused to transport embryos to Cali-
fornia despite a request from the couple involved. The
Court considered the bailor-bailee relationship that
existed between the couple whose non-transferred
embryo from IVF was stored in a fertility clinic [54]. The
Virginia clinic argued that their contract with the couple
only allowed for three possible dispositions in the event
the couple did not proceed with IVF at the clinic of origin:
1) embryo donation to another infertile couple, 2) dona-
tion for human embryo research, or 3) destruction. The
York decision is significant because the language used is an
explicit recognition of the couple's proprietary interests in
the embryo. The case was decided in favour of the couple,
as the Court noted that the medical treatment agreement
did not state that the attempt to achieve a pregnancy was
limited to procedures employed at the clinic of origin.
Paraplaix v. CECOS [56] also framed the issue of reproduc-
tive autonomy in a property context. This matter con-
cerned the use of sperm for posthumous reproduction,
where a widow requested the release of sperm from her
deceased husband in order to achieve pregnancy posthu-
mously. However, he had not made any specific disposi-
tion of the sperm his will. His widow nevertheless
contended that the sperm formed part of the property of
the deceased's estate, and was thus capable of being inher-
ited. In contrast, CECOS argued that sperm was an indivis-
ible part of the decedent's body (similar to a limb) and
was therefore not inheritable as property. The widow was
ultimately successful on grounds of her procreational
autonomy argument, but not on the basis of the property
argument. The Court held that 'sperm does not constitute
a thing in commerce but secretion containing the seed of
life destined for human procreation'.
While Paraplaix involved gametes rather than IVF
embryos, it remains relevant because it offers one route
Irish courts might take in construing the embryo as prop-
erty. Since this decision held that 'sperm does not consti-
tute a thing in commerce', if the embryo is aligned with
sperm for analysis purposes, then Irish Courts might also
reject the property model. The parallel is imperfect, how-
ever, since it could be argued that someone has a right to
decide what is to be done with stored sperm. The person
who made the deposit should 'own' or have a property
interest in the stored sperm as it 'is his semen in a biolog-
ical and property sense, and thus he has the right to decide
what happens to it' [53]. Furthermore, sperm is signifi-
cantly different from the non-transferred embryo as the
latter is created by sperm and ova derived from a partici-
pating couple, unlike sperm which is the simple deposit of
one individual – a specimen by itself lacking the potential
to develop into a human being. For frozen sperm, a prop-
erty analysis can therefore be more easily argued.
Although these precedents in other jurisdictions could
influence Irish Courts in determining which model to
adopt where the fate of surplus embryos created by IVF is
disputed, this influence hinges on the applicability of the
Constitution to the IVF embryo. Should Irish courts deter-
mine that Constitutional protections are not applicable to
non-transferred embryos, then a modified property
model may be used. This does not accept the property
approach absolutely, but rather would recognise the
respect owed to the human embryo while acknowledging
that the participating couple have an interest in what hap-
pens to the subsequent embryo.
But is the non-transferred embryo ever 'owned'?
To ascertain if the embryo can be regarded as 'property' so
as to allow one party in a dispute to exercise control over
the destiny of that embryo, it is useful to analyse the
debate surrounding the ownership of other body materi-
als or components. Intuitively, it is quite natural for an
individual to think in terms of 'my body' and to infer that
because it is 'my' body, that the person can determine pre-
cisely what is done to it, or its parts [57]. In Anarchy, State
and Utopia [58], the concept of 'self-ownership' was intro-
duced and has since figured prominently in philosophical
debates on issues ranging from taxation and exploitation
to suicide, abortion and surrogacy [59]. 'Since there is an
open-ended set of use-privileges and control-powers over
one's own body, it seems natural enough to speak of
'owning' one's bodyif I am not a slave, nobody else owns
my body. Therefore I must own myself. Therefore I must
own all my actions, including those which create or
improve resources. Therefore I own the resources, or the
improvements, I produce' [60].
The matter of body ownership was explored in Doodeward
v. Spence [61], which highlighted a dispute where the
plaintiff sought the return of the preserved corpse of a
two-headed stillborn baby from the police. The plaintiff
claimed that he had a 'property' claim over the corpse. The
Australian High Court agreed, stating 'when a person has
by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a
human body or part of a human body in his lawful pos-
session that it has acquired some attributes differentiating
it from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right
to retain possession of it, at least as against any person notPage 8 of 15
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ial, but subject of course, to any positive law which for-
bids its retention under the particular circumstances.'
The Court of Appeal in R v. Kelly & Lindsay [62] accepted
the methodology of Doodeward, and concluded that in cer-
tain circumstances parts of corpses are 'property' and are
therefore capable of being stolen. In Kelly, a sculptor was
alleged to have stolen human body parts from the Royal
College of Surgeons. The question that arose for the Court
was: Could these body parts be considered as property in
order to convict the accused of theft? The Court held that
parts of a dead body may be property (and may therefore
be capable of being stolen) when 'they have acquired dif-
ferent attributes by virtue of the application of skill, such
as dissection or preservation techniques, for exhibition or
teaching purposes'. This exception, coupled with the deci-
sion in Doodeward, may be useful to Irish Courts in draw-
ing conclusions that the embryo may be considered to
constitute property.
Application of the principles from Doodeward may yield a
useful analogy to IVF embryos, as their creation certainly
requires an element of special skill. It should also be
noted that the storing and thawing of embryos presents
some technical challenge, and could be regarded as con-
stituting 'preservation' for the purposes of affinity with
Doodeward and ascribing a property status to the IVF
embryo.
Interesting and complicated questions will arise as owner-
ship rights over non-transferred IVF embryos are explored
in Ireland. Perhaps the State could recognise property
rights for IVF embryos, but also devise a framework within
which those rights must be exercised. Otherwise, there
could be some judicial hesitancy to resolve a dispute over
stored embryos in the context of a pure property model.
Furthermore, in the absence of a legally defined frame-
work, application of an absolute property model to non-
transferred embryos could provide a couple with disposi-
tional control the power to excericse unlimited rights over
their embryos – potentially doing whatever they wished
with that 'property'.
Informed consent and non-transferred embryos: 
limitations and legal challenges
While the legal status of non-transferred embryos awaits
legal and/or judicial clarification, the process of informed
consent still must be transacted between IVF patients and
their doctors. Medical informed consent is a crucial factor
in any dispute arising over the disposition of stored
embryos. In a medical context, informed consent is a for-
mal process by which a patient can be said to have given
permission for a proposed treatment based on a full and
clear appreciation and understanding of facts, the implica-
tions and future consequences of the proposed treatment,
the expected outcome(s) following treatment, awareness
of alternative treatment(s), and the possible consequences
of refusing treatment. To give informed consent, the indi-
vidual concerned must have adequate reasoning faculties
and be in possession of all relevant facts when consent is
given. Unless a valid informed consent is obtained, any
subsequent physical interaction between doctor and
patient constitutes assault, unless the encounter is covered
by the concept of necessity. Since IVF is always an elective
medical procedure, therapy cannot begin unless the treat-
ing physician obtains written informed consent first
[36,47,63].
Although there have only been a small number of cases
involving the status of IVF embryos thus far, some Courts
have regarded the informed consent (when properly exe-
cuted) as a binding contract, and decide who shall have
dispositional control over the embryos on that basis
[20,47]. In an Irish context, if Courts should adopt this
contractual model in order to decide 'custody' of any dis-
puted non-transferred embryos, then this would allow the
judiciary to avoid the difficult questions raised by the
Constitutional status of the 'unborn'. Unfortunately, the
language of informed consent for IVF in Ireland is not uni-
form and has never been standardised, so variation
among clinics could be problematic.
As background, surplus or non-transferred embryos from
IVF may be safely cryopreserved for extended intervals
[64,65], although a specific informed consent is also
required for this procedure. In Ireland, there is no limit to
the duration of such storage, in contrast to the UK, where
embryos are frozen for a maximum period of ten years.
After ten years, surplus embyos in the UK are thawed with-
out transfer, and thus are 'allowed to perish'. It should be
noted that the 'thaw without transfer' provision for non-
transferred embryos permitted in the UK cannot be easily
adopted in Ireland, due Medical Council guidelines and
the unresolved question of Constitutional protection of
the unborn as contained in Article 40.3.3.
The potential conflict between 'thaw without transfer' and
the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Consti-
tution notwithstanding, some IVF providers in Ireland
include language in the written informed consent stipulat-
ing certain circumstances where the clinic retains the right
to dispose of non-transferred embryos by thawing them
without transfer. Patients undergoing an IVF sequence at
such a facility must agree in writing that when the wife's
age exceeds 45 years, or when the cryopreserved
embryo(s) have been in frozen storage in excess of 5 years
– whichever occurs first – any non-transferred embryos
will be removed from storage, thawed, but not transferred
(i.e. destroyed).Page 9 of 15
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such a 'thaw without transfer' clause invites the possibility
of a judicial test of contract enforcability. This is because
institutions using this type of informed consent in Ireland
make access to IVF conditional upon a couple's agreement
that their non-transferred embryos could be 'thawed with-
out transfer', a procedure itself inconsistent with current
Medical Council guidelines. While this may have been
influenced by standards lawfully set in the UK, a written
informed consent in Ireland enumerating situations
where intentional destruction of human embryos by
'thaw without transfer' treads on terrain that has not yet
been Constitutionally tested.
In the event of circumstances changing in the relationship
of the couple who underwent IVF treatment, such as the
death of either partner, separation or divorce [63,66],
what would be the fate of any non-transferred cryopre-
served embryos? What should be the scope of informed
consent for IVF in such cases? From a public policy per-
spective, is an IVF clinic's registration status jepordised
(with the Medical Council) if it incorporates a standard
'thaw without transfer' clause into its treatment agree-
ment? Would such an informed consent be considered
legally enforcable? How might Irish Courts analyse this
issue? The Irish Constitution (particularly Article 40,
regarding the 'unborn' and personal rights) is the only
substantive law in Ireland which can be applied to these
matters at present.
Courts in Ireland may consider decisions in related cases
from other jurisdictions to resolve such issues. The UK
case, R v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (ex
parte Blood) [67] involved a dispute over the fate of surplus
embryos and specifically addressed informed consent.
Under existing UK law the HFEA was allowed to prohibit
a woman from using her husband's sperm in the UK,
because it was obtained without consent from her hus-
band (who was incapacitated due to a comatose state). In
1997, the HFEA permitted the wife to export the sperm to
Brussels for use in an IVF treatment there. The Court of
Appeal's judgement confirmed that the principle of
informed written consent is an essential part of English
law, and that the posthumous storage or use of sperm or
eggs without such consent is unlawful.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) [68], offers a
useful appeal mechanism for any individual from the E.U.
wishing to revisit a Supreme Court decision regarding the
status of non-transferred embryos. In Article 12, this con-
vention provides that 'Men and women of marriageable
age have the right to marry and to found a family, accord-
ing to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right.' And, since Article 8 states that 'Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life' [68], it could
be argued that the right to procreate is inherent in either
ECHR article. Accordingly, should the Supreme Court of
Ireland make any pronouncement on the Constitutional
right to procreate, then the Roche case could be taken
before the European Courts with the assertion that the
decision infringed upon the individual right to procreate
(or to avoid procreation) under the ECHR. That Court's
judgment is binding on each EU member state that has
ratified the Convention, however there is no mechanism
by which the member state can be forced to implement
that judgment. Unlike EU law, the ECHR cannot overrule
the Constitution of Ireland, although many of the rights
in the ECHR are already contained in the Constitution of
Ireland. Thus, although individuals have the opportunity
to seek appeal in the European Courts, it is evident that
the State may avoid any obligation to implement a judg-
ment from European Courts if such judgment is inconsist-
ent with the Irish Constitution.
An example of this chain of appeal of a member state's
Supreme Court to the European Court is Evans v. Johnston
HFEA et al [69]. This case presented the first opportunity
the UK had to address the question of who should decide
the fate of a frozen embryo when disputed by its two pro-
genitors [70]. Following passage through the highest lev-
els of the English judicial system, the Evans case was
deliberated by the European Court of Human Rights. Due
to the lack of precedent regarding the fate and status of
non-transferred embryos in Ireland, the substance and tra-
jectory of the Evans case are likely to affect the Roche case,
or any similar case, brought before Irish Courts.
In this dispute, Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston were engaged
to be married and the couple had undergone IVF treat-
ment as chemotherapy treatment left Ms. Evans infertile.
They had pre-implantation embryos in storage intended
for future use. For Ms. Evans, the frozen non-transferred
embryos therefore represented her only chance of having
a child to which she was biologically related. When the
relationship ended and Mr. Johnston decided not to pro-
ceed with IVF, it was contended that his withdrawal of
consent would interfere and permanently frustrate Ms.
Evans' overwhelming ambition to have children. The cen-
tral issue here was whether the interference with her pri-
vate life was necessary and proportionate given the
circumstances. Ms. Evans advanced an number of argu-
ments that the English law's interference with her private
life was unlawful. Mr. Johnston wanted the six non-trans-
ferred embryos destroyed, while Ms. Evans wanted to use
them to achieve pregnancy.
Ms. Evans sought an injunction from the English courts
compelling Mr. Johnston to restore his consent. She
claimed that: (i) Mr. Johnston may not vary or withdrawPage 10 of 15
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may be stored throughout the remainder of the ten year
period, (iii) Ms. Evans may lawfully be treated with
embryos during the storage period, (iv) A declaration of
incompatibility to the effect that Section 12 and Schedule
3 of the 1990 HFE Act 1990 breached her Article 8,12 and
14 rights of the ECHR, and (v) That the embryos are enti-
tled to protection under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR [70].
In UK Courts, Ms. Evans unsuccessfully argued that her ex-
partner should not be allowed to withdraw his earlier con-
sent to the creation, storage, and use of the embryos. The
Court took notice that under the HFE Act 1990, consent
from both partners is required at every stage of the IVF
process, including transfer. The Court of Appeal dismissed
her appeal and held that Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston only
gave consent to the use of the embryos for 'treatment
together'. As the couple were no longer together, the
informed consent provided by Mr. Johnston's at the
beginning of the IVF sequence was considered no longer
valid. The Court highlighted that under Schedule 3 of the
HFE Act 1990, Mr Johnston had an unconditional statu-
tory right to withdraw or vary consent to the continued
frozen storage of the embryos as well as their transfer. The
Court of Appeal also held that the statutory requirement
of continuing consent did not breach the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, as it was proportionate to the
legislative aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of
both parties. The Court stated that a non-transferred
embryo does not have a qualified right to life under Arti-
cle 2 of the ECHR. While the Court of Appeal determined
that the refusal of treatment (due to Mr Johnston's with-
drawal of consent) was an interference with Ms. Evans'
right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR,
the Court held this interference was proportionate to the
need that made it legitimate. They did not recognise that
this was Ms Evans's last chance to have a genetic child
[70].
After exhausting all avenues of appeal in the UK, Ms.
Evans next turned to the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg, arguing that by making the exercise
of her reproductive rights dependant on Mr Johnston's
consent, her rights governed by Article 8 had been
infringed. The European Court found that such a position
would diminish the respect owed to Mr. Johnston's pri-
vate life in proportion, as it enhanced the respect accorded
to hers. The Court also noted that a balance must be struck
between Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston's privacy rights, yet
the legislature (acting through its designee, the HFEA) had
done this by requiring consent from both parties. Ms.
Evans also argued discrimination under ECHR Article 14,
on the grounds that in natural reproduction, men cannot
withdraw consent to reproduction once the sperm has
been voluntarily given whereas in IVF, men could modify
or withdraw their consent at various stages. Nevertheless,
the European Court decided that this difference in IVF was
justifiable because even though in natural conception the
male does not have the right to withdraw consent, the
HFE Act 1990 aimed to treat both parties equally even
though this does not happen in nature. The UK scheme of
consents inherent in the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act was therefore upheld, with Mr. Johnston pre-
vailing [69].
It should be noted that Ms. Evans' argument that the non-
transferred embryos had a 'right to life' under ECHR Arti-
cle 2 was denied. The Court denied this argument because
English law does not protect the rights and interests of the
foetus prior to birth thus, so it would be anomalous to
give such rights to non-transferred embryos. However,
application of this component of the Evans decision in
Irish law will be difficult given the differences between Ire-
land and the UK with respect to Constitutional issues.
Evans was the first case on fertility treatment to be consid-
ered by the Human Rights Court, and the judges acknowl-
edged that there was no international consensus about its
regulation or to the status of non-transferred embryos.
The Court was sensitive to the fact that their verdict
deprived Ms. Evans of the ability to give birth to her own
child, but they did not seem to consider that this may be
the determining factor to allow her use of the stored
embryos. The Court also insisted that Ms. Evans's inability
to override the withdrawal of consent by the other 'genetic
parent' did not breach her human rights.
While some commentators on the Evans case recognised
that women's investment in pregnancy, child-birth and
the IVF process is greater than men's [42,71], no jurisdic-
tion thus far has regarded this as a sufficient reason to ele-
vate female rights above those of the male, with respect to
ECHR Article 8. Given the lack of precedent in Ireland, the
Evans case is likely to be a substantial persuasive authority
on the Roche case, or any similar case brought before Irish
Courts.
AZ v. BZ [72] furnishes another example where the valid-
ity of consent forms signed by a couple before beginning
IVF treatment and embryo storage was considered. The
Court held that a consent paper signed by a man stipulat-
ing that in the event of separation his wife could have the
use of stored embryos, could not be enforced against him
years later, as it would require him to become a parent
against his wishes. The Court further held that agreements
entered into by the couple when they initiated IVF should
be enforceable, but determined that either party could
later change his or her mind about the disposition of the
embryos, and if, after a divorce the parties disagreed as to
disposition of any non-transferred embryos derived fromPage 11 of 15
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prevail. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court held that 'a contract to procreate is contrary to New
Jersey public policy and is unenforceable', relying on the
1988 decision In the Matter of Baby M [73], which held
that a maternal surrogacy contract was unenforceable as a
matter of public policy. In New Jersey, the Court ulti-
mately decided that the right not to procreate outweighed
the right to procreate. While the Court suggested that it
was willing to enforce agreements dealing with non-trans-
ferred IVF embryos, its rule ultimately rendered all such
contracts unenforceable. This is because mere disagree-
ment by either party vitiates the contract in favour of the
non-procreative rights of the party wishing to disallow
embryo transfer and subsequent potential pregnancy.
A thoroughly prepared and properly obtained written
informed consent prior to IVF can still be helpful at law
[48,63,66]. The verdict in Roman v. Roman [74] deter-
mined that a written informed consent signed by a couple
specifying that their frozen embryos be discarded in the
event of divorce was valid. The ruling reversed a trial
Court's award of frozen embryos to the wife, who had
wanted to use them for in utero transfer and potential pro-
creation. The Court found that written agreements
between embryo donors and fertility clinics to which all
parties have consented are valid and enforceable, pro-
vided that the parties have an opportunity to withdraw
their consent to the terms of the agreement. The Court
determined that the public policy of Texas would permit
a husband and wife to enter voluntarily into an agreement
before IVF treatment commences and make provisions for
the disposition of any non-transferred embryos in the
event of contingencies such as divorce, death or changed
circumstances. The decision in Roman suggests that care-
fully drafted IVF consent forms can be enforced, consist-
ent with public policy.
Indeed, the preliminary ruling in the Roche case directly
addressed the issue of informed consent, and hinged on
whether Mr. Roche had given consent for the future
implantation of any non-transferred embryos [75]. Mrs.
Roche asserted that her former husband was the legal
father of the frozen embryos, having signed a contract
agreeeing to take full responsibility for the outcome of
IVF. But Mr. Roche told the Court that circumstances had
changed, he no longer wanted to have more children with
his former wife, and claimed that they never made an
agreement about the future use of frozen embryos [76].
The Court ruled that Mr. Roche had not given his express
or implied consent for future utilisation of the non-trans-
ferred embryos.
Regarding this case, an officer of the Irish Fertility Society
stated that, 'Each episode of treatment requires the con-
sent of all parties involved and this consent may be
revoked by any party should their circumstances
changeWe cannot accept that either partner should be
coerced into any fertility treatment, even if he or she has
already had treatment which has lead to the creation of
embryos' [21].
Yet is there merit in an alternate view that assumes the
couple, by agreeing to undergo an elective medcial proce-
dure such as IVF, create an implied contract to use any
embryos derived from such treatment to attempt to have
a child? Any subsequent disputes should therefore be
resolved in favour of the party seeking to procreate, as that
was the original intention of the treatment [77-79]. Vol-
untary participation in the IVF process could be regarded
as conduct reasonably leading to the assumption that
both parties have committed to reproduction. In the event
of changed circumstances, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel becomes essential, as the party who subse-
quently seeks to use any non-transferred embryos relies,
to his or her detriment, on the other party's commitment
to reproduce jointly: 'The partner who opposes implanta-
tion of the embryos should be estopped from asserting his
or her right not to reproduce'[80].
But the Court determined that when Mrs. Roche initially
gave informed consent when she agreed that the embryos
would be transferred in utero, that the three embryos men-
tioned in the informed consent document were those
which were transferred 'fresh', not frozen. The purpose of
cryopreservation of any surplus embryos was to use them
if the first 'fresh' transfer failed. Mr Justice McGovern
noted that, 'In light of the evidence in this case and the
documents which have been produced, it cannot be said
that it was the presumed intention of the parties that the
three frozen embryos would be implanted in the woman's
uterus in the circumstances which have arisen, namely fol-
lowing the success of the first implantation procedure and
the legal separation of the couple' [76].
In Litowitz v. Litowitz [81] the written informed consent
stipulated that any non-transferred embryos be allowed to
perish after five years in storage. A dispute developed after
the couple separated, as the husband wanted to put the
embryos up for adoption and the wife wanted to have
them transferred to a surrogate mother. In this case, there
was also an egg donor involved who wanted the embryos
back if the wife did not prevail. The Court considered the
husband's interest to avoid procreation as stronger than
that of the wife, and ruled in his favour.
While parties can trust courts to 'do the right thing' by bal-
ancing the conflicting interests should disputes over non-
transferred embryos arise, IVF clinics have a responsibility
to craft their informed consent in a way that is as compre-Page 12 of 15
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titioners have the best expertise in the field and are keenly
aware of the potential difficulties that could develop [82].
It was just such an unfortunate outcome that led to the
dispute in the Roche case, where 'neither the wife or the
husband adverted to the issue [of embryo disposition]
until their marriage broke downin the absence of the con-
sent forms indicating agreement either expressly or by
implication, there was no agreement as to what was to
happen to the three frozen embryos in the circumstances
which have arisen' [75]. One of the curious features about
the Roche case was that the consent forms provided at the
time treatment commenced did not specifically address
the disposition of any frozen embryos [83], either in the
event that pregnancy was achieved from the first embryo
transfer, or if their circumstances changed such as upon
the death of either partner or a separation or divorce. The
informed consent process in the Roche case was therefore
found unsatisfactory from a legal sense [76], because it
outlined the fresh transfer sequence but did not anticipate
contingencies arising from any cryopreserved embryos.
Informed consents for IVF in Ireland mandating 'thaw
without transfer' are at risk of similar judicial criticism,
but for different reasons. While the Court's decision in the
Roche case provided some minimal conditions for how
informed consent should be structured for IVF in Ireland,
the fertility clinic that treated the Roche's had already
modified their consent process before the case became
public. Nevertheless, clarification about what should and
should not be included in Irish IVF consent forms is
needed.
Conclusion
The two conflicting interests in cases dealing with the dis-
position of non-transferred embryos represent the right to
procreate, and the right to avoid procreation [2,20]. The
obvious problem for Irish Courts, in common with all
other jurisdictions, is that enforcement of one person's
rights denies the rights of the opposite party [84,85]. It is
therefore necessary to determine whether these rights are
equal, or whether one right should outrank the other [86].
The 'right to procreate' has been variously regarded as
either superior to the 'right to avoid procreation', or that
the 'right to avoid procreation' does not exist at all in the
context of IVF [63,85]. Similarly, it has been argued that
there is only a negative moral right to have children, there-
fore no one should be allowed to interfere with procrea-
tive efforts. Couples have no positive moral right to have
children, which implies that childless couples have no
positive right to assisted procreation and that the State has
no obligation to provide such services.
While various arguments posit that the rights of the party
wishing to avoid procreation from use of non-transferred
embryos should prevail [87], an exception has been sug-
gested for the partner who has no other possibility of hav-
ing a genetic child except by transfer of such embryos [79].
It has even been suggested that 'if the non-consenting
party simply wants to avoid having custody or financial
reponsibility, a court could convert the party's status from
being the parent of a frozen embryo to being an "egg
donor" or "sperm donor" without the custody or financial
obligations of parenthood' [88]. But whether or not a par-
ent has the right to obtain such a waiver or release from
the other parent (i.e., a disengagement of a gamete pro-
vider for the express purpose of avoidance of support obli-
gations) on behalf of the child remains uncertain [89].
However, the 'right to procreate' has not yet gained the
same legal traction that the right to avoid procreation has
received [35,90], and procreational autonomy is only one
model the Irish Courts could adopt in resolving a dispute
over the fate of non-transferred embryos. This would
require a difficult assessment of the rights of both parties
involved (and potentiallly the rights of the embryo) in
deciding who will control embryo disposition. Our judi-
ciary is likely to balance the parties' rights in determining
disposition of non-transferred embryos with considera-
tion to precedents in the UK, U.S., and EHCR; such influ-
ences are likely to favour the party wishing to avoid
procreation. Yet the need for statutory guidance is high-
lighted by the Roche case, as inconsistencies or omissions
in treatment consent forms signed by Irish couples under-
going IVF are now left for medical providers to remedy at
the clinic level. If this does not happen, then Irish Courts
will expend considerable resources to resolve the resulting
disputes. Indeed, 'the Irish Government has not provided
a confidence-inspiring track record of legislatively dealing
with complex and controversial problems raised either by
reproduction or reproductive technologies. Policy and
regulation is needed in the area of [assisted reproduction]
and many observers of democracy assume that the public
should have a positive role in debating desirable priorities
for application' [91]. The vital public policy question
therefore must be asked: Why has comprehensive regula-
tion of IVF remained elusive in Ireland, despite our costly
and impressive array of competent professional and aca-
demic agencies?
If it were established that there is a Constitutional right to
procreate in Ireland, then prior decisions rendered else-
where suggest that there is a superior correlative right not
to procreate. In a dispute over the fate of non-transferred
embryos, would the Constitutional protection of the right
to life of the embryo (if it were defined as 'unborn' for the
purposes of the Eighth Amendment/Article 40.3.3) then
override the desire of a party seeking to avoid procreation,
if that right 'inalienable and imprescriptable' was pro-
tected by Article 41 of the Constitution as 'superior to allPage 13 of 15
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direction taken by Irish courts awaits the Supreme Court's
judgment in the Roche case.
As the incidence of infertility rises, the number of IVF
cycles will continue to grow. This trend, when added to
the regrettable upsurge in marriage separation and
divorce, cannot help but increase the potential for the
involvement of Irish Courts in disputes involving non-
transferred embryos. Although deciding the fate of non-
transferred embryos in the wake of a relationship break-
down is an arduous task, the public policy consequences
of ignoring the problem are undoubtedly more ominous.
All branches of government in Ireland must act in a coor-
dinated fashion and engage urgently on this far-reaching
and profound issue with multi-generational ethical, polit-
ical and legal ramifications.
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